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124 Religious Brotherhoods of Chechnya 
collapse of state authority, (2) a lack of faith in state officials, (3) economic adversity, 
and (4) persistent intervention by Islamic groups from abroad. The violence that came in 
1999 to Dagestan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikstan was driven by these factors and 
the Chechen situation is subject to the same factors. 
Connections with Taliban and Other Outside Groups 
Recognition of the fact that such an important and dynamic brotherhood can, like 
other Islamic movements for national liberation, pose a challenge to Western society 
prompts legitimate questions about their relationship with Islamic organizations outside 
the region. While Islam did much to provide spiritual comfort to Chechen soldiers during 
the 1994-96 war, it has undergone dramatic changes during the decade since the collapse 
of the USSR. Most important, open borders have made it possible for Arab missionaries 
espousing a more radical form of Islam to find convelts in the Caucasus region as well as 
what was Soviet central Asia. The newly converted Muslims have been increasingly 
hostile to Chechnya's traditional Sufi orders and have opened the door to outside groups 
with more violent tendencies. 
One such organization that has attracted attention because of these developments 
is the Taliban movement. While there are important philosophical differences between 
Chechen religious brotherhoods and the Taliban there are also some similarities. The 
essential fact, however, is that within Chechnya there is little interest in the Taliban or, 
for that matter, other such groups located abroad. The primary reason for this disinterest 
is the fundamental provincialism of most Chechen movements. They see events and 
actors within Chechnya and the Chechen community as of primary importance and all 
others of limited relevance to their struggles. 
Apparently, the Russians take the Taliban much more seriously. Reportedly, 
Russian President Vladimir Putin feels Osama bin Laden and the Taliban have supported 
Chechen efforts to gain their independence from the Russian Republic and has even 
threatened to bomb Afghanistan if necessary. 
Chapter Seven 
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Islam in the North Caucasus: 
A People Divided 
Yavus Akhrnadov, Stephen R. Bowers, and Marion T. Doss, Jr. 
Executive Summary 
Religious diversity has had a dramatic impa~t on. the devel?pment ~f tl:e ~orth 
. P I d ot identify primarily with either a natIOnal or lIltematlOnal Caucasus regIOn. eop eon . '. .' 
Islamic community.The fundamentalist Vakhablte commumty h~s become a maJ.or 
. I f d" g the past decade in spite of numerous efforts to suppress Its 
re glOna orce U111l . f 
. fl Official suppression of the Vakhabites has resulted 1Il the emergence 0 a 
~~m~;~s~~~e Vakhabite network supported from abroad: !slamic. radicals throughout t~e 
, ( tl S d' and NOI·th African Arabs) have Jomed w.lth the Khattab group 1Il 
regIOn mos Y au I . " ,. 
d . 'l'tary tral'lll'ng in camps whIch are operated to SUppOit Atab tenonsts. or er to receIve ml I 
Khattab was born in Saudi Arabia. ..., 
The Chechen diaspora that has played a major supp~rtll1g ro!e I~ the. modem 
. II . tl HashemI'te Kingdom of Jordan IS returnmg Its children to Middle East especla y 111 le ' . 
CI h A'lld now the return of Chechen Jordanians such as ShamII Bassayev and Ip~k lec nya, , b . b t· t 111 F tl h hied to radicalize many young Chechens who ecame active. com a dn ~ 
t:e lCh~Ch:/ wars. Money, armaments, and soldiers (ml~jahideen) pr~vlded by raelIcal 
Islamic groups from abroad have played a major role 111 strengthenlllg the Chechen 
resistance movement. . h S f 
After the first Chechen war (1994-1996), religious dIffer~nces be.t,,:een. t e u. I 
d th v, khabI'te movement beaan to have a deletenous polttIcal Impact 1Il movements an e a '" Id ' 
h . Wh'l S fi Muslims called for creation of a secular state that wou. pres
elve 
t e region. leu 'f" . f I I d the 
.. I . I tt· s the Vakhabites have demanded a pun 'lcatlon 0 s am an tradItlOna SOCIa pa em , . . 
eradication of local customs that have tainted and undermllled pure Islam. 
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Preface 
While ethnic animosities have a long history in the North Caucasus, the religious 
flavor of those conflicts appeared more recently. With time, Islam became a uniting force 
that helped many people of the North Caucasus assert their struggle against the 
oppression of those whom they viewed as "men without faith." However, while Islam 
served as a rallying point for disparate groups within the region, Islam itself did not 
assume a unified organizational model. Local customs and paganism had a profound 
impact on Islam as it developed throughout the North Caucasus. Almost no expression of 
faith could be characterized as "pure Islam." 
When the religious element emerged as a significant one in this part of the former 
Soviet Union, it varied greatly whether one encountered it in Daghestan, Inghusetia, 
Chechnya, North Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, or Adygeiya. 
With the appearance of perestroika, religious diversity has a dramatic impact on the 
traditional Islamic community. It may be that the only common element in the Islamic 
community was the religious fervor that gripped so many people. New mosques appeared 
by the score and Daghestan combined with Chechnya produced more pilgrims for the 
annual hadj than the rest of the USSR combined. 
Islamic diversity was driven by a variety of factors. One of those was the influx of 
foreign money from Middle Eastern Islamic states. The persistence of local traditions was 
another but the most important was the increased prominence of the Vakhabite movement 
within the Islamic community. The central theme of this movement was that Islam in the 
North Caucasus had been distorted by misunderstandings as well as by the "impure" 
influences. 
Along with some other North Caucasian peoples, the Chechens converted to Islam 
on the eve of Russian expansion into their ancestral lands. For a variety of reasons they 
largely adopted the Sufi forms of worship and followed Shamil, the third Imam of 
Daghestan, in his efforts to impose the Sharia (Islamic Law) on the faithful while 
defending their homeland from the encroachments of the Russian Empire in early 19th 
century by waging a holy war (Ghazivat). Our first Chechen paper (Religiolls 
Brotherhoods ill Chechllya: Their RelevClll.ce for the Clzechell. Conflict) explained how the 
Chechens were bled during these wars and then left the Naqshbandiya tradition in droves 
to follow a later Sufi tradition, the Qadiri, under the leadership of the nonviolent 
"Chechen Gandhi," Kunta Hadji of Kishiev. 
When Kunta Hadji was captured by the Russians and died in captivity, his 
followers eschewed non-violence and joined with the Naqshbandis in periodic uprisings 
against the Tsarist regime and its Soviet successor. Each effort to regain some vestige of 
independence was cruelly suppressed, Between 1944 and 1957, the Chechen people were 
removed from their indigenous lands and deported to central Asia in order to be punished 
for alleged collaboration with the German Nazi regime. Only the death of Stalin allowed 
people to return to Chechnya and attempt to rebuild the nation, 
The breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed independence-minded 
Chechens to seize the opportunity and declare Chechnya an independent nation for the 
Russian Federation. Fearing that other North Caucasian peoples might want to follow the 
Chechen example, the Russian Federation under President Boris Yeltsin decided to make 
an example of the Chechens and defeat them utterly as a warning to other indigenous 
peoples from the Black Sea to the Caspian. After two desultory wars the Russians seem 
in control but the Chechens continue to resist aided by volunteers from other Islamic 
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lands who want to impose a more militant, fundamentalist Islam on the Muslims of the 
Caucasus. 
Background In 1877, the people of Chechnya and Daghestan launched a major rebellion 
against the Russians who enjoyed control over their region. Although the rebellion was a 
failure that served primarily to produce new tactics on the part of the Sufi brotherhoods 
of the North Caucasus, the victorious Russian authorities responded not with oppression 
but rather with tolerance toward the Islamic religion in Chechnya. The religious tolerance 
of the post-rebellion years of 1877 to 1917 has led Chechens to speak of Tsarist 
colonialism with nostalgia. One Chechen rebel commander, Shirvani Bassayev, brother 
of the well-known Chechen guerilla commander Shamil Bassayev, recently noted that 
had the Romanov dynasty retained power, Russia would have been a very different 
nation. The key, Bassayev noted, is that men without faith, such as the Communists, "are 
more dangerous than those who accept God as a higher power." I 
The spirit of rebellion, coupled with religious fervor, continues to give the politics 
of the North Caucasus a turbulent, violent flavor. Local people who have cooperated with 
"men without faith," most significantly the Russian authorities who occupy much of this 
region, increasingly find themselves the targets of rebels for whom this struggle has 
assumed a spiritual as well as a political relevance. A typical incident was reported in the 
summer of 2000 when Ruslan Khamidov, the mayor of Alkhan-Yurt, a small town ncar 
Grozny, was approached by "unidentified assailants" at his home early one morning. 
When he stepped outside his house, Khamidov was shot cleven times, an action generally 
viewed as another warning for those who cooperated with the "Godless invaders." This 
killing coincided with an attack on a Russian troop train on the rail line near Grozny. The 
bombing, which was carried out by remote controiled mines, was followed by a small 
arms attack which lasted for forty minutes. The incident left seven Russian military 
casualties and more than a hundred yards of destroyed track. 2 
While outside observers might view such events as little more than another expression of 
the terrorism that has plagued so much of the former Soviet Union, many participants in 
this struggle have an entirely different perception. For them, the murder of Ruslan 
Khamidov was actually another episode in the continuing struggle between "men of 
faith" and the infidels determined to destroy their way of life. 
To better understand the logic of conflicts in the North Caucasus, a brief 
description of the patterns of the region's religious and social life is necessary. The most 
important characteristic of this society is its strict division along tribal and religious lines. 
This is best illustrated in Chechnya. Although the Chechens are a separate ethnic group 
clearly distinct from their neighbors, they seldom identify themselves with that group. In 
everyday life, their identity is defined by two most meaningful concepts: teip - a union of 
households tracing their descent from a common ancestor, or clan, and tllhkum-a union 
of teips which do not claim a common ancestor but historically have preserved their 
military and economic ties and spoken one of the dialects of the Chechen language. 
Traditional kinship ties are of paramount importance to the Chechens, and their loyalty 
1 John B. Dunlop, Russia COllf
rollts Chechllya: Roots of a Separatist COllflict , (New York: Cambridge UniversilY 
Press, 1998), p. 33 
2 Associated Press, 16 July, 2000. 
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?elongs first and foremost to their clan and then to their tuh' . 
Itself the least relevant notion on theil'II'st f . .. kum, which leaves the nation o prIorIties. 
The same pattern, although perhaps not as stron I 
Chechnya's religious life. Islam not onl 't h g y expressed, can be observed in 
. 'f' d' Y Ul1l es t e Chechens but lb' b 
Slgl1l lcant Ivisions in the society Again tl Ch I a so nngs a out 
C 
.' ., le ec lens and other I f h 
aucaus Identify themselves with small . . I' . peop e ° t e North 
Muslim community. They belong to virds el allletolglOuS grolllPS. rather than a nationwide 
I
. . . - nomous re IglOUS sects I d db 
re IglOlIS teachers. Every vird has its s 'f' I .. lea e y llstaz -
d
'f'f peci IC ru es prInCiples and h' h 
I er considerably from dogmas accepted cIs h ' Th canons w IC may I d I . ew ere. e members of . d . 
P e ge a leglance to their sects and arc obI' d t b vIr s - munds -
teachers. Thus, Chechen sects arc in essenl~e ~? ey the orders of their religious 
together by common principles discipline and
e 
rbe Igdl?US . orders or brotherhoods held 
. . . ' su or matlOn Virds ar 't d . 
major relIgIOUS unions _ tarikats _ each h d db' . e Ul11 e mto two 
"qadiriya" (one of the most famous sheiks of ~~eelatte~; sheikh: "na~.shb.an~iya" and 
of them represent currents of Sufi Islam. as Kunta-HadJI KlshIev). Both 
Sufi Islam in the North Caucasus has a b f .. . 
it f~om the Islam accepted in Asia and the 'Mi~~;:: ;~s~ pecuhar~t~es whi~h d!stinguish 
ancient customs and norms and pagan bel' f th. . The tradltl.onal kmshlp values, 
centuries were so deeply entrenched in the :~~~tal~: r~f~:ated the hIghlanders' lives for 
that Islam had to adapt and transform in orde' t b ~ le people of the North Caucaus 
"traditional" Islam that developed here was ICh~ra~t~~~::~ed. Con~eque~ltly, the so-called 
customs and paganism It is different in m f by a stlOng lIlfluence of local 
other countries, and its' influence on sociat~~ WI ays lrom "pure" Islam as it exists in some 
d
ie las a ways been severely r 't db I 
an norms that had formed before the adoption of Islam. lmt e y va ues 
Religion In the North Caucasus 
The "men of faith" praised by Bassa ev and oth . . 
development of the North Caucasus in previ~ . ers had a dramatic Impact on the 
TI f
. "us centunes as well as cont . 
le Irst of these men were Christians but by th 8th' emporary times. f I C' " e century Arabs began t 
many 0 t le aucasJans to Islam. In the first part f tl . d ' . 0 convert 
religion in Daghestan, Ingushetia and Chechnya 
0 
W liS s~~ y we Will ~ocus on the role of 
some of the less frequently studied parts of the N~rth ~:~cas~;:~ examllle the situation in 
Daghestan 
The Republic of Daghestan spreads over 50 tl . 
population of approximately two million peo Ie The lousand squ~re kll~m~ters and has a 
Muslims _ 85%, while 4% are Shiites pril:a·i A ov:r~h~lmmg majorIty of them are 
Christians. There are also small com~~1l1ities ~I/C t~e~. atJan~, and. 8.5% are Orthodox 
had a Jewish community of over 30000 b tao ICS an Baptists. Daghestan once 
tl J . ' , u most of them moved to I I A 
le eWlsh population now numbers only I 000 I srae. s a result, 
. ' peop e. 
Thus, Islam IS the overwhelmingly dominant . r . . 
Daghestan. Spiritual leadership and governance in 'Da I~ IglOUS group 1Il contem?orary 
appearance of perestroika and the subsequent social di~n~stan .began to chang~ WIth the 
had traditionally been a single dominant M I' I d egratlOn. Up to that tlllle, there d' . ' us 1m ea er for Daghestan D' I . 
lsruptlve transitional period, numerous inde e d M . . urmg t liS ~ained local followings and cultivated their ~;n e:t usltm leaders appeared and 
Identify the following communities as those 11"' ~odlytes. Consequently, one may 
, , aVlllg 1Il ependent spiritual governance 
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(muftiyas): Avartses with a population of 600,000; Dargintses ~ith a 320,000 ~op~llati~n; 
Kumyks with 260, 000; Lezghins with 240,000; and Laktsts with 100,000. Thls.dlV~rslty 
reflects the national composition of Daghestan. There are 95,000 Chechens-Akkms 111 the 
region, 30,000 Naghaitses, and an assortment of about forty additional national groups. 
Most of Daghestan's Sunni Muslim population belongs to the shqfiit mazhab 
organization. During the last decade, the Sufi brotherhoods, which had lost importance 
during the Soviet era, have been restored. . . 
Currently there are over 40 Sufi brotherhoods m. Daghe~tan. .The. major 
representatives of modern Sufism in Daghestan are ~heologlsts SaId Clmkelsk ~nd 
Tadjuin Hasavyurt. Together, these men hold the allegl~nce .of ma~y devout Ml~sllll~s 
who are adherents of a strict interpretation of the Koran. Hlstonans Will record that 111 thiS 
region of the Northern Caucasus there are other people, individuals s~ch ~s Magh~med 
Djeranskyi, who are less concerned about theology and, thr~ugh the.lr VIOlent aC~lOns, 
bear much responsibility for the violence in the Caucasus. DJeranskYI, of course, IS not 
alone as there are many others who share his militant attitude. 
In Daghestan there are approximately 1700 large and as many as 6000 small 
"district mosques." There are nine Islamic spiritual educational institutes and 600 mosque 
schools throughout the republic. In addition, a significant number of Daghestani students 
study in Muslim schools abroad. Of the 17,000 -18,000 Rus~i~n citizens participating .in 
annual hadj, no less than 13,000 to 14,000 of them are cItIzens of Daghestan. It IS, 
therefore, reasonable to conclude that the Daghestanis are more active in Muslim affairs 
that the entire populations of Tatars, Bashkirs, and other Muslim nati.onalities. . 
A group that has attracted great attention in recent years IS the Va~habltes or 
Vakhabists. They are referred to as fundamentalists in much of the Western lIterature on 
Islam. They first appeared in the North Caucasus in the 1980's and emerged as a serious 
force in the next decade. Most recently, their main communities were in Mahachkala and 
Hasav-Yurt. 
Today Vakhabite activity is prohibited in Daghestan .. As a r~sult, their scho?ls 
and organizations operate secretly and they are involved m a va:.lety, of . cla~dest1l1e 
activities. There are three main Vakhab factions in Daghestan. The first faction IS under 
the leadership of Ahmed Ahtayev, an activist with a long histor~ of clandestine w.o~k. 
The second faction is led by Baghaudin Muhhamad Daghestan!. Because of offiCial 
pressure against his activities, he left Daghestan and is n~w based in Chechnya. The thi.rd 
faction is based in communities in the Astrakhan region, a stronghold of Vakhablte 
support, but has not prominent individual ~ead~r. '.. 
In August 1999, many Daghestal1l radicals began traI~l~g m the camps run b~ a 
Saudi Arabian calling himself Khattab. Khattab's group had Jomed Chechen extremists 
and numerous Arab terrorists who invaded Daghestan. The goal of this union of Islamic 
radicals is to bring about the secession of Daghestan from the Russian Federation. While 
this association failed to achieve its immediate goal, it did bring about the introduction of 
Russian forces into Chechnya, a situation that has greatly increased hardships throughout 
the region. Many feel that this was probably one of the objectives of those who 
organized the attacks in Daghestan. . . 
One of the main reasons for the growth of Vakhablsm m Daghestan and 
Chechnya is the difficult social and economic situation in the ~?rth Caucas.u~ as well as 
the generous financing of the Vakhabites from abroad. T~1Us.' It IS ~ot surpnsmg th.at the 
joint attacks by the Daghestani and Chechen militants comclded with the aggravation of 
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tensions in the Middle East and the renewed international confrontations over oil and gas 
routes. 
Chechnya 
~efore the m!litary clashes ~f 1994-1996, Chechnya covered a territory of 17,300 
square kilometers With the populatIOn of 1,200,000 people. Of this group, 800-850,000 
were Chechens, 200-250,000 were Russians, 20,000 were Inghush and about 15000 
Armenian. ' 
As a result of the conflict, Chechnya's population has been reduced to 500000 
people, with a Slavic population of only 10,000 people. The physical destruction of the 
region is widespread and cap.it~1 GroZI.1Y itself is now gradually being covered by new 
forests as few people are wIilmg to mvest the resources required for rebuilding the-
devastated city. 
. The Ch~c.hens and the Ing.ush are Muslims-Sunnits. Approximately 90% of the 
RUSSIans, UkraIllIans and BelorussJans of the Chechen Republic belonged to the Christian 
Orthodox church, while the others belonged to the Evangelical and the Baptist Churches. 
During the late 1990's, several Christian priests in Chechnya were kidnapped and 
murdered. 
. . The ~ntensity of religiosity in Chechnya can be measured by two important 
1l1dlcators. First, several thousand mosques, both regional and district ones were built 
durin.g the last 1.5 years to serve the spiritual needs of this community. Se~ond, in the 
RUSSIan FederatIOn, only Daghestan exceeds Chechnya in terms of the number of 
pilgrims who journey to Mecca. One to two thousand Chechens participate in the hadj 
each year. 
Spiritual governance of Checnhya since the early 1990s was in the hands of a 
body k~own as the Counci~ of Ulems and of an individual known as the MUftiya. The 
former IS a group of theologIcal scholars and the latter is the head of Muslims. From 1995 
until. early 2000, the Ml!ftiya. ~as ~hmad Hadji Kadyrov, who has recently been 
appol11ted as the head of Adm1l11stratlOn of the Chechen RepUblic. In the summer of 
2000, a new Ml!ftiya was elected by the Council of Ulems. That individual is the former 
Iman of the Shatoi, region Ahmed Adji Shaman. 
For. already several centuries Chechnya's traditional Islam has been represented 
by two Sufi trends: the Naqshballdi and the Qadiri. The best known of the naqshbandi are 
the brotherh?ods of Yusup-~adj~ ~nd Tashu-Hadji. The most numerous quadiri 
brotherhood IS the Kunta-HadJI KlshJev order. The relations between these two Sufi 
?rotherl~oods ?ave traditionally been very positive. Their representatives never engaged 
111 c.onfllcts With each other, and never criticized the shaykhs of the other communities. 
While there was an element of competition inherent during election of the imam of the 
village mosque or Quadiri of the community, that competition never evolved into 
dogmatic disputes. 
T~er~ is no exact information on the emergence of Vakhabism in Chechnya, nor 
a~out then' first preachers. Many scholars associate its appearance with the establishment 
of th.e Islamic P~rty in 199 ~. Yet, Beslan Ghentaimirov, the first head of that party had 
nothl11g to do WIth Vakhablsm. Furthermore, according to reliable accounts, leaders of 
the Islamic Party, have been known to indulge in the excessive use of alcohol. Given the 
hostility of the Vakhabites toward any use of alcohol, such behavior would indicate that 
the Islamic Party leadership would not meet the standards for a Vakhabite organization. 
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Others suggest that the appearance of Vakhabism is more correctly associated 
with an individual known as Adam Deniev or, by many people, simply as "One-legged 
Ahmed." Deniev has been a candidate member of the shaykh of Quadiri since 1995. 
The first group in Chechnya to be openly associated with the Vakhabites and to 
actually receive money from them consisted of Islam Khalimov, Isa Umarov, and 
Movladi Udugov. Udugov, who was the Minister of Information in the Dudayev 
government, arranged for the regular broadcasts the sermons of Vakhabite preachers on 
Chechen television. This small circle of Vakhabites build an organization based on 
kinship principles while avoiding any direct challenges to the established Islamic 
community in Chechnya. In this early period, its operational principals were based on 
absolute secrecy and the avoidance of open conflicts with the Islamic community. 
The first Chechen war radicalized much of the population and eventually resulted 
in the legalization of fundamentalist youth groups represented by the "Djamaat" 
battalion. This move was facilitated by foreign involvement in the person of a Chechen-
Jordanian Ipak Fath. He was an elderly man who came from Jordan to assist in the 
development of fundamentalist groups in Chechnya. Fath had been a pmticipant in the 
Afghan war during which he helped organize suicide detachments of idealists motivated 
by the honor of dying in a holy war against the infidels. Eventually, lpak Fath succumbed 
to disease but not before making a great contribution to the fundamentalist cause in 
Chechnya. As a result of Fath's influence, Khattab and other veterans of the Afghanistan 
war were enlisted for combat service in Chechnya. 
The Jordanian connection was established approximately a century ago and 
continues to have an impact on develops in the North Caucasus region. In the latter part 
of the 19th century, thousands of Chechens as well as some Ingush traveled through 
Turkey into the Middle East where they made their homes in Iraq and Jordan. Two 
Chechen-Ingush villages still exist in haq today. In Jordan, the Chechens founded four 
towns, one of which evolved into what is now the kingdom's second largest city, Zarqa. 
As a result of this migration, the Jordanian diplomatic and military community today 
reflects strong Chechen influences. In fact, during the 1948 war with the Palestine 
Liberation Army, Jordan's foremost tank officer, Abdul-Latif Benno, was a Chechen and, 
in 1978, became Jordan's first military attache in Moscow. 20t 
Vakhabite influence increased significantly during the first Chechen war because 
Dudayev refused to provide alternate financing. In the face of the severe funding crisis, 
lpak Fath and his colleagues played a major role in purchasing armaments and providing 
food and clothing for the Chechen forces. The foreign Vakhabite money was channeled 
through Maskhadov's organization. Consequently, he was forced to make promises to 
introduce Shari at governance following the war. 
As a result of the radicalization of society and the effective use of foreign funds, 
by 1996 the Vakhabites not only had a military organization in Chechnya, but also their 
own courts, mullas, and scholars. To take advantage of this environment, Baghaudin 
Khebedov left Daghestan to join his radical brethren in Chechnya. Other fundamentalists 
such as Shamsudin from Prigorodnoye established reputations for themselves as Shariat 
judges and numerous Chechen preachers who had taken refuge in Jordan were able to 
return to their homeland. 
201 Karny, pp. 273-285. 
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~ft~r creation of the main state institutions of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria at 
the. beg~I~Jllng of 19~7, the Vakhabites were rewarded by being able to legalize some of 
theIr Imlttary fOIlTIatlOns and to. establish a b~se for training their military personnel led 
by commander Khattab. Their representatives were placed in numerous off . I 
. . . II ICla govemment positIOns, especla y those relating to the courts and public secUl'ity b d' 
Th . V kh . . fI . 0 les. e gro,":lI1g a. ~blte 111. ~Ience 111 the Maskhadov government eventually resulted in a 
:very senous polItlc.al cnsls brought about by demand for curbing the Vakhabite 
ll1fl~l~nce. The M~lfttat headed by Khadyrov demanded that President Maskhadov take 
decIsIve steps agamst those whom he denounced as "enemies of Islam and the Chech 
nation." en 
In June 1998, the crisis led to armed clashes with the Vakhabite detachments near 
Gudermes. In those battles, a group of government field commanders defeated the 
Vakhab forces and it was only the intervention of President Maskhaelov and Vice 
President A. Arsanov that saved them from a devastating, final defeat. After these battles 
tw~ Vakhabite generals who had demonstrated crass incompetence were reduced t~ 
enhsted ranks. Khattab was order~d to close his training camps and to leave Chechnya. 
For the g.avernment the :VIctory was not complete. While the order to disband his 
camps was pubhshed, Khattab Ignored it. The Vakhab forces regrouped in the town of 
Vrus-Martan anel Khattab formed an alliance with Shamil Bassayev. The financial 
support from abro~d enabled t~e Vakh':b.ites to function without any financial support 
from the st~te bodle~ of Ichkena. A fortified outpost was set up in Urus-Martan. At this 
s~age Of. theIr e,:,olutlOn: the Va~habites utilized more mundane tactics, such as theft and 
kldn.app1l1g, varIOUS actIOns aga1l1st t~e young Chechen state, and personal attacks against 
president Maskhadov. Several assasslllation attempts were made against Maskhadov and 
Khad~rov. Thus, th~y concentrated on political and criminal activities as a means of 
opposll1g the IslamiC establishment of Checl1l1ya While avoiding open la 'ge- I 
'1' I h ' I sca e ml Itary c as es. 
'. In the fall of 1999,. Bass.ayev's detachments joined Daghestani Vakhabites and, 
Wlt~ the help of Arab muellaha?~ns, made military strikes against Daghestan authorities. 
While the attacks were a mllttary failure, they did bring about concessions from 
Maskhadov. In an ef~ort to appeas~ his o~ponents, Maskhadov included Bassayev in the 
State Defense CommIttee and app01l1ted hun as a military commander. 
T~el~y Vakhabites are exclu?ed from the religious life of Chechnya and Khadyrov 
now prohibits all forms of Vakhablte propaganda. This is part of an effort to resto tl 
. f h d' . , re le prestIge o· tetra ItlOnal Muslim faith. Unfortunately, during this period the so I'al I f r' . , ,c, roe ~ r~ I~~on III gen~ral has dec.lined; th.us, even if .the traditional Islamic community 
legall1s Its lost prestIge, Islam Will not enJoy the promlllent position its once held. 
The prese~ce of ?:,er IOO,~OO.Russian troops on the territory of the RepUblic and 
the e~l~less RUSSIan mIlItary activIties are .a ~ajor source of discontent among the 
populatIon .. NoIany Ch~chens, however, are stOIC III the face of such adversities and regard 
them a~ dlv1l1e pUl1lshment for their arrogance and their willingness to admit the 
Vakhabltes, whom they ~enounce ~s "servants of Devil" into their country. 
At presen~, Mushm clergy 111 Chechnya are mull as and imams. Muslim clergy in 
Chechnya are hIghly educated people who were trained in Islamic institutions of 
Chechnya, ~agh~sta.n, ?zbekistan, Pakistan and Egypt. In addition, Chechnya has its 
o~n theologlca~ II1stltutlons and s~hools. Thel:e are Sunday Arab Koran schools in every 
Village. In othel wordsm, the prestIge of IslamIC clergy has increased in Chechnya as they 
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have withdrawn from politics. The important point is that Islam is .not being politicized as 
the Vakhabites wished. In this new environment, _ t.h? IslamiC ~Iergy can express 
themselves freely on major issues without fearing for offiCial persecutIOn. 
Inghushetia . . .' , 
The small Republic of Ingushetta covers an area of 3600 squate kilometers .. It has 
. I t' f 300000 and about as many Chechen refugees. In ethmc and a native popu a Ion 0 , '  .. 
lin uist terms, the Ingush are very close to their Chechen neighbors. Thell' religIOUS 
19t 1 w vel- are different since the Ingush were converted to Islam later and cu ures, 10 e , . . f '1' I I . 
embraced it with less intensity. Moreover, there has b?~n n? tradition 0 ~I _Itan~ s am.111 
Inghushetia, a factor which has had a major and positive Impact on thell lelatlOns with 
Russians. 3 . .. 
Like most of the Chechens, the Ingush people are Muslim-Sunllts. Currently 
Ingushetia is experiencing a revival of religiosity and boasts a total of over. 400 mo~q:les, 
most of which were constructed in recent years. Over .1,000 Ingush. re.cel\:,e a religIOUS 
education each year, either in Ingushetia or abr~ad. Sp!ntual leadership. IS d_Irecte~ by the 
M f '· Alb hl'ev who maintains good relations wIth the nelghbonng lepublics. But u~ ~~ " ._ .... 
unlike Chechnya, the spiritual leaders of Ingushetta do not chum to dlle~t participatIOn 111 
tl t'te overnance and have not demanded the introduction of the Sharlat ~a.w. 
le s a F~r the most part, the Ingush are associa~ed with on~ of the tw~ trad~tlonal order~ 
of Islam. The Naqshbandi order is represented 111 IngushetJa by tl:e blOthelho?d o~ Dem 
Arsanov, a highly respected figure whose descenda~ts are held 111 equally high .Iega~d. 
The son of the Shaykh, Hias Arsanov, left Chechnya 111.1996 because of the conflIct WIth 
lchkelia authorities and is currently residing in Ingushetta... .. . . 
The Qadiri order in Ingushetia is .p~-im.arily. associated with Kunta-~adJ1 Klshlev 
d I I -e relatl'ons with their coreli O lOl1Ists 111 Chechnya. In the 19 century the an las c os "'. _ . b fl' _ 
brotherhood of Batal-Hadji appeared in the Ingush Village ot Surl:ah~. ~em ers 0 ~ liS 
brotherhood strictly observe their Charter. They a~'~ very well dlsclpl111ed and lIiuted 
under the leadership of the descendants of Batal-HadJ!. . . 
L . f' m the tragic example of Chechnya, which suffered so much as a 
earmng ro . . _. 'd I . I d 
I f I·· dl'splltes the Ingush Muslims have managed to leslst I eo oglca an resu tore IglOUS , " V' kl . b 
. . In 1998 Vakhabism was formally banned 111 Ingushetla. a la dogmatic extremism. . . h 
.. . XIJelied alld theological schools alhed with them were closed. T e emlssanes wete e . . . . f 
Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ingushetia was given responsibility for the suppression 0 
Vakhabism. . f - r . 
While some of the young Ingush citizens, mot~vated by a sense 0 Ie Ig:ous 
bligation participated in military activities during the first Chechen war, they aVfllded ~nvolvem~nt during the second conflict. Their opposition to the seco~d war ~as. a .. !It 
f I · . . t' Vakll'lbl'sm as well as the slave-trade often assoctated With It. Many o t lelr rejection 0 "'_ 
Ingush families suffered as a result of that slave-trade. 
Northern Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessia, and 
Adygeiya . d Ad . 
Northern Ossetia, Kabardin-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessla, an ygelya .are 
located in the central and northern-west regions of the North Caucasus. The populatIOn 
3Anato1 Lieven, Chechl1ya: Tombstol/e of Russian Power (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1998). p. 100 
Issues of the Post-Communist Transition: Structure. Culture, and Justice 135 
adheres to ethical norms of mountaineers, rather than to religious values. Unofficial Sufi 
brotherhoods never played a significant role in this region. By the 1970s religious 
traditions such as circumcision, having a mull a' s blessing for all marriages, and others 
had been eliminated. 
In the 1990' s new phenomena of spiritual life related to the interest in the Muslim 
values and "the great past" started to appear in the national republics of the Central and 
Northern-West Caucasus. Religious governance headed by muftias was introduced 
throughout the region. Islamic educational institutions, including higher educational 
facilities, were opened. Most were created with encouragement and funding from abroad. 
Mosques were restored in practically all communities of Balkaria, Cherkessia, and 
Ossetia. Eight mosques were opened in Karachayevo-Cherkessia, even though Muslim 
population amounts for only half of the popUlation there. The other half of the local 
population embraces Orthodox Christianity. 
The completion of the Islamization process in these republics has been associated 
with at least one constant theme. The radical Islamic organizations have worked to fill in 
the vacuum that appeared after the disappearance of the communist ideology. The 
"Daavat" groups have popularized Vakhabism and recruited youth from the mountain 
regions into military groups. During the period fr0111 1996 to 1999 dozens of young 
people from Balkaria and Karachay were trained in the camps of Khattab near Sejen-
Yurt. They were active participants in military activities during the 15t Chechen war. 
Traditional Islam is regaining its lost status primarily among the peoples who 
suffered from deportation during World War II, especially among Balkars and 
Karachayevos. Many elements of Sufi practice have been restored in the communities 
populated by those who have returned from internal exile. 
The hostility of traditional believers towards the Vakhabites has grown stronger 
because the Vakhabites, who view only Vakhab traditions as legitimate, do not recognize 
the customs and traditions of the mountaineers as valid. In Kabardin-Balkaria fight 
against Vakhabism has been especially determined and often bitter. Authorities have 
eliminated the most ardent armed extremists and have expelled or disbanded a number of 
suspicious organizations financed from abroad. 
There are up to 2000 Vakhabites in Karachay, but their ranks often include 
common Muslim radicals who have not formally embraced the Vakhab faith. While it is a 
tribute of dubious merit, one must note that it was the Karachay Vakhabites who were 
recruited to commit acts of terrorism in Moscow and Volgodonsk. 
The heads of both Christian Orthodox and Muslim communities deny that there 
has been a religious intrusion into the territory of the North Caucasus. That is why the 
Russian Orthodox Church has not given any special blessing for the war in Chechnya 
either during the 1
st 
or the 2
nd 
Chechen Wars. It disapproves of the cruel treatment of 
local civilians by the army but takes no public position on any of these concerns. 
Vakhabism and the Chechen Conflict 
While the focus of this study has been the North Caucasus region, the impact of 
religion on the region's conflict has been most dramatic in Chechnya. In contemporary 
Chechnya, as noted above, traditional Islam is challenged by a new phenomenon called 
vakhabism. Originally, this movement emerged in the 18th century and was named after 
its founder AI-Vakhab. He claimed that Islam was distorted and called his followers to 
"purify" it and return to Islam's fundamentals. Nowadays vakhabism is spread across the 
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Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, where it is accepted as an official ideology of the 
royal family. Vakhabism in Chechnya (as well as Tadjikistan), however, does not relate 
directly to vakhabism as it is understood by Sunni Muslims in the Middle East countries. 
Although the main idea is the same-the purification of Islam from both "pagan" and 
modern influences-Chechen vakhabism has a set of characteristics that distinguish it 
from religious values and practices in Saudi Arabia. 
The Vakhabite movement has deep implications for Chechnya's religious, social 
and political life. Its call to purify Islam chal1enges Chechnya's traditional Islam, 
something which is heavily influenced by the local system of beliefs and norms, as well 
as an elaborate structure of religious communities and brotherhoods. In fact, Vakhabism 
attempts to "return" the population to what it views as "original" Islam, rejecting 
Chechnya's unique historical experience. The key to this transformation is the application 
of rules, norms and practices accepted among the radicals in the Middle East to the 
Chechen social and political life. Hence, traditionalists (who constitute the overwhelming 
majority of the popUlation) associate Vakhabism with foreign influence, which poses a 
threat to their religious customs and identity. For their part, the Vakhabites view the 
supporters of traditional Islam as backward sectarians who distort Islam. The conflict 
between fundamentalists and traditionalists, along with less sharp but nevertheless 
significant divisions among Sufi sects, since the early 1990s has had a profound impact 
on Chechen politics, including the ongoing Russian military operation in the region. 
During the 1994-1996 military operation, the Russian federal troops were a 
common enemy for most Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites. Both were mobilizing the 
population against the federal government (most Chechen leaders identified themselves 
with Sufi brotherhoods to secure the support of their members; for example, President 
Dudayev declared that he belonged to the Kunta-Hadji brotherhood). Therefore, their 
differences were temporarily put aside. Moreover, the Vakhabites managed to strengthen 
their position in Chechnya. Money, armament and fighters provided by their radical 
counterparts from abroad were crucial to the Chechen resistance against the federal forces 
and enabled Vakhabites to become an influential group in the repUblic. The relations 
between Sufi brotherhoods and Vakhabites deteriorated dramatically after the end of the 
1994-1996 campaign. Their religious differences spilled over into politics. 
In the political realm, traditionalists and fundamentalists disagreed over how the 
Chechen state ought to be organized and what its policy towards Russia should look like. 
Sufi Muslims advocated a secular state that would preserve Chechnya's traditional social 
structure and its unique Islamic culture. Their position on the future of Russian-Chechen 
relations was not uniform and ranged from calls for independence to the development of 
a "special status" within the Russian Federation. There is no evidence that Sufi 
brotherhoods had any interest in protracting the conflict or extending it beyond 
Chechnya's borders. Vakhabites were determined to build a "pure" Muslim society which 
would be organized and regulated according to the Shariat law (as opposed to adat -
traditional norms developed in Chechnya before the adoption of Islam). "Just Islamic 
order" as they believe it had existed in the times of the Arabic khalifat became the goal of 
Chechnya's religious extremists. Furthermore, they embraced the idea of creating a larger 
Islamic state in the Northem Caucasus which would include Daghestan, Ingushetia and 
possibly other Russian regions. Since those regions chose to stay in the Federation and 
their predominantly Muslim population did not sympathize with fundamentalism, the 
only means of achieving this objective was aggression against Russia and then gazavat 
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(or jih~d) - h?ly war aga~nst non-believers (in Daghestan, since the early 1990s the 
p'0pula~lOn ,;e}ected the .Ideas of vakhabism and the leadership declared them 
. undeSIrable 111 the repu~hc. In June, 2000 all Vakhabite organizations were prohibited 
111 Daghestan by an act of Its parliament). 
Thus, V ~khabites chal\enged the official Chechen leadership (President 
Maskhadov and ItS supporters) and posed a serious threat to the foundations f tl 
CI h . A I . . 0 le lec en socIety. s a resu t, offICIal Grozny was becoming more and more CI't' I f 
I h b · .. llca 0 va ~ a Ism 111 Its statements and declarations. However, Maskhadov took no decisive 
actIon, as he. ~eare~ that woul~ exacerbate the situation in the republic. Confrontation 
between tradItlonaltst~ and radicals resulted in violence several times; for instance, as 
noted above, Vakhabltes ~Ia~hed with Sufi Muslims in May, 1998 in Gudelmes and 
~rus-Martan and the.n agam :n Gudermes in July, 1998 (approximately 50 people were 
killed that day). Feanng th~t fundamentalists will destabilize the situation in the republic 
a~l~ attempt to. r~bel agamst ?rozny, Maskhadov. dec1~red the state of emergency, 
dIssolved and dlsatmed the Shanat Guards and IslamiC regiment, and ordered to exile the 
wel.l-known warlord Khattab, a mercenary from Jordan who allegedly cooperated with 
rachcals. On July 23, 1998 there was an attempt in Grozny to assassinate Maskhadov an 
attempt probably organized by Vakhabites. Observers from Russia Georgl'a Aze'b :. 
• . • c ••. , , I atJan 
and Chechnya Itself agreed that at that pOInt the republic was on the brink of civI'1 
D . I' . war. 
. esplte t lelr relatively ~trong positions, Vakhabites were not able to assert their 
ll1f1uence throughout the repu?hc, much less impose their ideology in its entire territory. 
~owever, they wen~ ahead WIth their plans to occupy neighboring Russian regions and 
ll1~~d~d Dag!lestan .111 A:Igust, 1999. Although me~bers of Sufi brotherhoods may have 
pattt~lpated 111 the mvaSlOn as well, the Idea and Its implementation are blamed by the 
RUSSIan govemment and the local population primarily on Vakhabites Subs t 
. " . . . . cequen 1I1vestlgatl~ns and the fact t~at the offlc~als Grozny from the very beginning announced 
that the7 did not have ?llythll1g to do with the events in Daghestan and condemned the 
a~gre~slo~ further conv1l1ced Moscow that fundamentalists had started their jihad and the 
SituatIOn 111 Ch.e:hI~ya was out of control. Vakhabites were perceived as a major threat to 
peac~ and.stabll.lty m the Northern Caucasus and the territorial integrity of the Federation. 
The 1l1VaSlOn of Daghestan and the Vakhabites' plans to wage a holy war aaainst Ru . 
t 'l h . . f" I" . " '" sSla un I t e CleatlOn 0 a pure y IslamIC state 111 ItS southern territories were the top reasons 
that p~ompted the federal government to start a military operation in Chechnya 
Immediately after the defeat of those who attacked Daghestan. 
As .the feder~1 troops advanced into Chechnya, however, they had to fight not 
only IslamiC extremIsts but also the members of Sufi brotherhoods who, like in 1994-
1996, R~ssian contro~ f?r various reasons opposed. Unlike fundamentalists, Sufi Muslims 
do not fIght f~r a. reh~lOus. caus~ and tend to have more reasonable positions on issues. 
Moreover, then' dissatisfactIon .wlth the situation in ,the republic in the 1996-1999 period 
encouraged them to cooperate m a number of cases with the Russians. As a result rna f th S f' . . d . , ny 
o . e u I COmmUl1Itles engage 111 negotiations with the federal representatives and 
avold~d armed contllct. Som~ of th~m openly supported the military operation and 
o.rgal1Ized volunteer troops to fIght aga1l1st both Sufi and Vakhabite rebels on the Russian 
SIde. 
, ~ brief, a. certain S:lfi co~munit~ mayor may not fight the Russians or 
."akhabltes depend.1I1g OI:.thelr traditions, hIstory, kinShip ties, religious idiosyncrasies 
and even geographIC position (the popUlation in the mountains is generally perceived as 
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very militant and hostile even to fellow Chechens from the flatland, whereas the northern 
part of the republic has been loyal to Moscow). On the other hand, Vakhabites are, almost 
by definition, inclined to resist the Russian military operation and subsequent restoration 
of peaceful life and order. Therefore, the Russian government, the military and the 
population at large view Vakhabites or any other radical Islamic movement as the biggest 
obstacle to the stabilization of the situation in Chechnya. Traditional Sufi groups are 
MoscoW's most valuable partners in the struggle against extremism when they choose to 
cooperate, and therefore the federal government makes efforts to support traditional 
Chechen institutions mentioned above - teips, tukhums, virds and tarikats. There is a 
belief that they will help prevent the spread of extremism and facilitate the return to 
normal life. 
The Vakhabite Perspective 
We first need to emphasize a number of important points. First, Chechen society 
has a very complicated structure and is fragmented along the lines of kinship and 
religious identification. All politics is local and driven by narrowly defined interests of 
clans or brotherhoods. A nationwide movement, whether pro-Russian or anti-Russian, is 
not likely to emerge as long as the present tendencies persist. The roots of and the 
solutions for the Chechen crisis are in interactions among different factions of the society, 
not in national interests or aspirations of an ethnic group asserting itself. Second, Sufi 
brotherhoods play an important role in mobilizing public support either for or against the 
central government or any other authority; their decisions and actions are best explained 
individually on the case-by-case basis. Third, religious extremism does exist in Chechnya 
and for various reasons is accepted among a certain portion of the population. It calls for 
the redesign of the Chechen society in accordance with the principles of fundamentalist 
Islam and the conquest of neighboring lands, thus antagonizing traditionalists within 
Chechnya and the federal government. The confrontation between them and Sufi 
Muslims has been one of the most dramatic aspects of the Chechen crisis. Fourth, 
Vakhabites triggered the next round of violence, and the events in Daghestan became the 
reason why the federal government responded with a military operation. Fifth, since 
Vakhabites are currently the biggest threat to MoscoW's interests, the federal government 
has supported traditional Chechen institutions, including religious brotherhoods in the 
assumption that they will effectively resist foreign radical ideas, although they also often 
deny Russian authority. 
In order to better understand the perspective of the Vakhabites, Mr. Albert 
Avduev, a member of the Chechen disaspora who works as an oil engineer, has presented 
his view of this phenomenon. While he privately describes himself as a "secret 
Vakhabite" he is very open in his efforts to promote a better understanding of the 
principals of those people who wish to cleanse Islam of its alien characteristics. 
Avduev prefers not to use the term Vakhabite, insisting that this term itself is a 
result of Russian propaganda. He maintains that Russian historians have distorted not 
only Islam but the movement that seeks to reform Islamic practice. For A vduev, Russian 
colonization led to a situation in which both the Islamic faith as well as Islamic society 
were corrupted. The flight of Russian serfs from the oppressive Czarist administrators 
was a significant factor that enabled Russians to penetrate the Caucasus as well as other 
portions of southern Russia. 
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Avduev explains this process as one which was d . b 0 prej~ldice against all people of the North Caucasus in' gel:~~~n b ~ an ~xtr~ne RussI~n 
partIcular. The Russian mass media, he argues have long prese tUd
a 
tlgaICnst hechens 111 
o b'" I'k '" n e 1e aucasus people 
aIe e1l1g more I e orangutans than humans" Rllssl'a' . 
CI h 
. s aversIon to the peopl f 
1ec nya and Daghestan led to a deliberate policy of enocid 0 e 0 
centu:y. "~eligious traitors" and Russians, he maintain~, work:;st;a~~y a~ t~e l~th 
IslamIC faith. According to Avduev a "holy war against b I' . "lstOlt t1e tlue 
. f 0 d ..' non- e level s was the only 
option 01 evout Musltms. WIth the weakening of comm . t 0 I I . I N h C U111S I U e, t 1e true beltevers of 
t 1e ort aucasus were able to work to restol'e t11' I .. . 
. ' elr egltnnate nghts R . 
authontles, Avduev 1I1sists, have undertaken a renewed geno 'd I .' us sIan 
the restoration of a true Islamic society in the North Caucas CI a campaIgn to prevent us. 
Conclusion 
While Islam has been very important in the development of the N °tl C 
region the I r 0 I 01 1 aucasus H' t : II PleoP
I 
els IV111g.t lere. do not identify with any single sect or doctrine 
IS onca y, t le s am of thiS regIon was suffused with I I . . 
t
o dOt' Th N I' ,many pre- s amlc customs and 
ta I IOns. e ort 1 CaucaSIan federation forged by SI '1 I 
h I
' 1aml, mam of Daghestan waged 
a 0 y Wal (ghazavat) aga111st the old ways ill order to impose lsI' . I I ' 
I t d 
. hR' dlmc aw t 1roughout the 
mana e an aga111st t e USSIan Empire in order to presel've't . d d . S f f h N' " I S 111 epen ence. Shamll a 
u lOt e aqshbandl order, demanded great sacrifices from h' I ' 
eventually conquered by the Russians. IS peop es but was 
In the .~econd half of the 1?th ~entury another Sufi order took root in the North 
Caucasus. ThIS was the more paCIfIstIC Qadiri order f d d b K " . 
TI Q d
. . ., oun e y ullta-HadJ Klshmev 
1e a trl partIcIpated along with the Naqshbandi in va . . . . . d o· th t '1' h f hR' ,nous 111smrectJons and revolts 
l1l111g e WI Ig tot e usslan Empire and throughout the Soviet .' d B h . 
Chechnya unilaterally declared its independence in 1991 th Q d' .p~llO. Y t e tIme b h d . ' e a IrI nte had evolved to 
ecome t e. ommant form of Sufism in Chechenya 
Dunng the 1990s and based on its support of Cheche . d d 
fundamentalist Vakhabite movement has become a rna' or re io~a;nf epen enc~, the 
numerou.s efforts by the Qadiri Chechens to suppres~ its fnfluenc:rc~1 ?esplt~ .of 
suppressIOn has resulted in the emergence of a clandestine Vakhabite net~ 0 lIS offiCIal 
from abroad, particularly the Middle East and Afghanistan. Olk supported 
. The Chech~n diaspora, which has played a major supporting role in th d 0 
Mloddle East, esp~cIally ~he former Ottoman Empire and successor states such a: ~:o ~~~ 
JOldan, has proVIded aId and soldiers to support their CI I . q 
. ~~~~~~y 
armaments, and soldIers (mujahideen) provided by various ndic I I I . . , 
abroad h I I d . ' a s amlc crroups from 
, ave a so p. aye a major role in strengthening Chechen resistance. '" 
After the fIrst Chechen war (1994-1996) religious dl·f· b 11 d I " rences etween the Sufi 
~ovement~, an t ~e Vakhabites began to have a deleterious political impact in tl . hlol~ SufI Mushms called for the creation of a secular state th le ~egl~n. 
tradItional social patterns, the Vakhabites have demanded a "f' t' at wfould pleselve 
end' r f I I PUll Ica IOn 0 Islam and the 
, Ica IOn 0 oc~ customs ~hat have tainted and undermined pure Islam. 
. The RUSSIan Federallon was greatly humiliated by its loss of tl f' 
Wat through the peace brokered by General Lebed in 1996 M . 1e Irst C~~c.hen 
and military officers longed for an opportunity to avenge 'this ~ny l111p~r:ant 'pohlt~Ians 
honor. Th~ Vakhabite effort to spread a pan-Islamic fundamenta~~:t :'~vi~:fatn .nat\o~1al 
Daghestan m 1999 gave Russia the opportunity it sought to redeem itself. by mvadmg 
140 Islam in the North Caucasus: A People Divided 
Within Chechnya. a divided people are confronted by two polar choices: either to 
work within the Russian Federation and survive physically or to sacrifice the nation upon 
the altar of jihad. Other Caucasian peoples (Circassians, Balkars, Ingush, Avars and 
Kumyks among others have opted to stay within the Russian Federation. Only the 
Chechens seem unable to moderate in the name of coexistence. 
Chapter Eight 
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION IN THE FORMER USSR: FALSE 
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